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Introduction
Iraq from the Ground Up
On December 18, 2011, the last American troops left Iraq, or so it 
seemed until 2014. That milestone event completed a difficult but 
successful military mission that had overcome enormous and daunt-
ing challenges. About 4,800 Coalition troops had been killed in the 
struggle for Iraq, almost 4,500 of them Americans. Great Britain’s 
losses constituted most of the rest. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis 
had died, most as innocent victims, a toll still rising every day.
Less noticed amid the understandable focus on military battles 
and casualties were the thousands of foreign civilians who joined the 
struggle for Iraq. I was one of those people. We started arriving soon 
after the Coalition invasion in 2003. I joined a small civilian army 
of American, British, and other expatriates deployed to help transi-
tion Iraq toward more democratic and more effective government, 
improve living standards, and rebuild much of its infrastructure.
As a political scientist and former city manager, the immediately 
critical democracy and governance work was where I thought I could 
help, but nothing in my education or career experience suggested 
that someday I would be working in Iraq. It was an adventure into 
the unknown and a dangerous one.
Eventually, I did three civilian tours in Iraq, one in each of its three 
major areas: southern Iraq, Central Iraq (Baghdad), and Kurdistan. 
People often ask me what it was like. This book is my answer. I was 
a small part of a nation’s struggle to forge a new identity and a wit-
ness to history. My time in Iraq was often rewarding and even joy-
ful, sometimes horrifying and sad, and ultimately unforgettable and 
life changing.
So much has been written and said about Iraq that one might 
assume we understand it clearly by now. In fact, there is still a lot 
we don’t understand. Media reports, expert analysis, and political 
spin in Washington and London focused mainly on how military 
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and political events in Iraq affected U.S. or British interests. This was 
understandable but left an incomplete and misleading picture. The 
impact of those events on Iraq itself was often ignored or treated as 
secondary. Many media and political explanations were contradicted 
by reality on the ground. Meanwhile, those civilian projects got lit-
tle coverage despite their importance in the overall Iraq policy. The 
view from the ground up has been missing. My purpose is to provide 
some of that perspective.
What we learned on the ground in Iraq is not just a history lesson. 
The internal struggle for Iraq is as intense today as it has ever been, 
its stakes are just as high, and it will continue for years to come. When 
President George W. Bush declared victory in 2003, Iraqis knew their 
struggle was not really over. When President Barack Obama declared 
in 2011 that the American military mission in Iraq was over, Iraqis 
knew his message was not about them. Such grand pronouncements 
from Washington convey the unintended message that developments 
in Iraq are mostly about us.
The withdrawal of American troops did not mean that Iraq did not 
need the United States anymore or that our commitment to Iraq was 
over. Too much was at stake for both countries. Those who believed 
we had no continuing interests in Iraq or that the country would suc-
ceed on its own or that further armed conflict would not occur there 
made a serious misjudgment. This became obvious in mid- 2014 when 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) invaded northern Iraq, sup-
ported by many of the same Iraqis the United States had defeated in 
2003 and helped to defeat again several years later.
In December 2003 I arrived in Amarah, the capital of Maysan Province 
north of Basra, to join the Local Governance Program of the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID or AID), the 
Department of State organization that initiates, funds, and manages 
projects in foreign countries. What timing! Three days later Saddam 
Hussein was captured.
Although public attention focused initially on the Coalition Pro-
visional Authority, which led the government until mid- 2004, most 
of America’s civilian effort was led by USAID. Britain’s Department 
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for International Development (DFID) led the British effort. Many 
other civilian- type projects were carried out by military units or under 
their protection. USAID enlisted not only its own personnel but also 
international development companies and nonprofits. They in turn 
recruited thousands to carry out their projects and hired security com-
panies that recruited thousands more to protect them. USAID itself 
called this civilian campaign “one of the largest efforts to provide 
foreign assistance by the U.S. government since the Marshall Plan.”
I came with no political agenda about whether invading Iraq was 
the right decision. That decision was hotly debated and raised doubts 
that will never go away but had already been made by others. I was a 
civilian public servant who came to help. From that motive I became 
part of the struggle for Iraq. I could not have imagined how difficult 
that struggle would be or the extent to which Iraq would come to 
dominate my life.
I soon became the advisor to the new Maysan Provincial Coun-
cil and soon after that launched a major democracy campaign. Our 
Amarah team was making great progress, and I had a job that hugged 
me back. Seemingly quiet Maysan, however, proved to be danger-
ous. The invasion that deposed the Baathists set off a major internal 
power struggle, exposing major fault lines in Iraqi society and cultural 
tendencies toward threats and violence. The issues dividing Iraqis 
made our work harder and more dangerous. It’s not a good feeling 
when your success is interrupted by an insurrection. The southern 
Iraq experience is part 1 of the story.
The civilian focus of the book implies no disregard for the U.S. and 
British military, whose members performed heroically in Iraq and 
buried too many fallen heroes. The military story has been well told 
in countless books, articles, and media accounts, and many more 
will be added to chronicle the military struggle against ISIS. Much 
less has been reported about the thousands of dedicated public ser-
vants, from both government and contract organizations, who took 
personal risks and endured daily hardships to help Iraq. Many accom-
plished good things that never got reported. Many experienced heart-
breaking tragedies and difficult crises. Not all of them returned home 
safely. This part of the Iraq story has seldom been told.
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I have written this book to tell a small but meaningful part of that 
missing story. In doing so, I seek to represent, indirectly, a thousand 
other stories that deserve to be told.
My second tour of duty, described in part 2, was a memorable tenure 
in Baghdad, from late 2005 to the end of 2006, as the national Anti- 
Corruption manager for the Iraq Civil Society Program. This stint 
coincided with the worst of the sectarian violence that overwhelmed 
Baghdad and surrounding areas and made life there nearly unbear-
able for Iraqis. The view from our high- wall compound was often the 
smoke wafting up from deadly car bombs that sometimes shook the 
building. Still, my program had projects in all eighteen provinces, 
with innovative Iraqi civil society organizations that did great work. 
Time would show that the Iraqi public was more impressed with our 
anti- corruption campaign than were the corrupt. The timing of my 
Baghdad departure was as fortuitous as for my arrival. I left for the 
airport just minutes after Saddam was executed.
Working on the ground in Baghdad opened a window on the tribu-
lations of the Iraqi people. When I arrived in Maysan, their big prob-
lems were the economy and massive unemployment. There were, 
however, underlying political tensions, rival militias, an emerging 
power struggle, and deadly incidents. Many Iraqis joined the Coalition- 
supported struggle to create a new and democratic Iraq, but others 
took up arms against it. Once the sectarian violence rolled over Bagh-
dad, millions of Iraqis found themselves trapped. Those caught in 
the crossfire lived in fear and struggled to survive, and tens of thou-
sands did not survive. I was responsible for a national Human Rights 
program too. It was not a good time for human rights in Iraq.
It is generally acknowledged that the Coalition’s good intentions 
were undermined by a lack of knowledge and by political and strategic 
mistakes. My on- the- ground account puts more emphasis, however, 
on the terrible things Iraqis have done to each other. A balanced anal-
ysis is impossible without reference to Iraq’s culture of violence, its 
religious extremism and intolerance, its gender inequality, its wide-
spread lawlessness, and its pervasive corruption.
The better print and electronic media have covered Iraq almost 
continuously since 2003, understandably focusing mainly on military 
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news and political debates in Washington and London. There was 
extensive reporting and analysis of the sectarian violence, but the full 
impact on Iraqis could not be grasped from those media accounts. They 
reported the mass casualty statistics from suicide bombs and other 
terrorist attacks but not the vast number killed one at a time by death 
squads and individual assassins, political and religious extremists, 
insurgents and militiamen, Iranian agents, and common criminals. 
The awful impact on the victims’ survivors was part of the unreported 
story. While the West debated how to deal with terrorism, the true 
meaning of terrorism was experienced by the Iraqi people.
The appalling security conditions directly affected our Iraqi staff 
members, who had to get home safely and return to work the next 
morning. My view from the ground up covers a small but important 
part of this mostly missing story. Security conditions greatly improved 
starting in 2007, from the success of the “surge” strategy led by Gen. 
David Petraeus, but life for most Iraqis remained difficult and often 
dangerous, and the violence worsened again starting in 2013.
My first- person account is also the context for analyzing Iraq issues 
in nontechnical language. Readers will learn a lot from this book, but 
please have patience for the explanations, as international develop-
ment involves inherent complexities. I learned many important les-
sons, summarized in multiple chapters, including one addressed to 
USAID issues. During all its years in Iraq, USAID has collected thou-
sands of official reports. This is an unofficial report.
The lessons learned address what went wrong but also what went 
right. Much of the cynicism about Iraq is misplaced. For sure some 
ideas did not work out as intended, more because of uncontrollable 
factors than USAID or contractor mistakes, but some of those ideas 
left something to build on, and many would work in other coun-
tries too. One of my projects finally succeeded four years after I left 
Baghdad. Despite the violence, and conceding the setbacks, people 
like me and my civilian counterparts accomplished a lot that wasn’t 
reported. Iraq’s continuing troubles don’t invalidate the contribu-
tions of those who went to help.
In late 2007 I went to Iraq a third time, as a consultant to the Minis-
try of Municipalities of the Kurdistan Regional Government, in Erbil, 
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an agency with 30,000 employees in all corners of the region. I thus 
became one of the few expats with the distinction of having served 
in all three major areas of Iraq. I traveled over much of the region, 
made official visits to its largest cities and many smaller ones, and 
stayed throughout 2008. This is part 3 of my story.
The political viewpoints of Iraqis within the three major areas are 
as different as for people in three separate countries. The opportu-
nity to compare them enabled me to relate developments in all three 
areas to the overall picture. That is one of my advantages in this book. 
The majority Shia, located mainly in southern Iraq, hated Saddam 
and hoped to inherit political power based on their numbers. The 
Sunni Arabs of Central Iraq, favored by Saddam, now faced an Iraq 
in which their traditional dominance was over. The Kurds, also Sun-
nis but not Arabs, looked forward to shaping their own future with-
out deferring to Baghdad. The Baathist legacy hung over all of them 
but in sharply different ways.
My departure from Erbil was not the end of my story. I remained 
engaged with people and events in Iraq. My story brings events up to 
the present time. I have also described my efforts, with mixed results, 
to help Iraqis threatened because they worked for my projects or for 
other Coalition organizations to move to the United States or other 
countries for their own safety. I wish my government had done more 
to help such people, and some of those they failed died as a result.
In April 2014 Iraq held its national election in an atmosphere of cri-
sis but with no inkling the situation would lead to disaster two months 
later, when ISIS seized Mosul and rampaged through much of Iraq. 
As events deteriorated, I was looking for a way to help. In mid- 2015 
I became coeditor of a new web- based newsletter based on Arabic- 
language sources, called Daesh Daily— Daesh being Iraqis’ pejorative 
term for ISIS. It’s a ground- up perspective that hopefully helps many 
government, military, think tank, media, and other practitioners. As 
Iraq’s military fortunes improved, we chronicled and commented on 
its progress, made with enormous American help, but also its con-
tinuing internal problems. Iraq desperately needed meaningful rec-
onciliation among its Shia, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds; a major reduction 
in political corruption; and a security climate in which people could 
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finally feel safe. By 2016 it was making progress toward these goals, 
but its future was still uncertain.
Part 4 outlines a reconciliation strategy for solving these complex 
and difficult policy issues and especially the future relationship of 
Iraq and the Kurds. These issues are much debated in both Iraq and 
the United States, often with wrong answers. Reaching successful 
outcomes depends on better answers and on continued U.S. diplo-
matic engagement with Iraq.
In total contrast to all the Iraqi bad guys we often read about are the 
modern- thinking, often college- educated Iraqis who want to live in 
a meaningful democracy, who relate easily to people from different 
religious traditions and different parts of the country, and whose 
worldviews are not anti- Western, anti- Christian, or anti- American. 
Some of those Iraqis worked for me and the organizations I served, 
and many times that number have worked for similar organizations, 
for the U.S. or British government, or for Western or other foreign 
news organizations.
Sadly, many Iraqis who went to work for Coalition organizations 
later realized they had risked their lives for their patriotism and those 
good- paying jobs. They were not protected by security once they left 
work. Especially in Baghdad, they went home to often dangerous 
neighborhoods and returned the next morning, never knowing who 
might be following them or whether this day might be their last. No 
position was low enough to avoid being targeted for working for the 
foreigners or for an Iraqi government accused of cooperating with 
them. Many kept their jobs a secret, even from people they knew. 
They were subject to death threats, and some of the death threats 
were carried out. Many others heeded the warning and quit their jobs. 
Hundreds of thousands left the country if they could. Some did not 
leave soon enough. None of these scenarios are hypothetical. All of 
them happened on my watch.
Because of continuing security risks in Iraq, I faced difficult deci-
sions on the use of Iraqi names in writing this book. Some Iraqis 
identified as working with “the foreigners” are still potential assas-
sination targets. Yet writing about people’s work and achievements 
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by using a string of aliases is unsatisfactory. Forced to choose, I used 
real names for those who left Iraq or died or who live in Kurdistan, 
where security is much better, or who told me they don’t feel threat-
ened. I also used the real names of public officials and a few others 
already well- known and so not at risk of being exposed by appearing 
in the book. I used only first names for some staff. I avoided using any 
names for most of those appearing once or twice in the story, depriv-
ing them of a little recognition but preserving their anonymity. All 
other names I changed in the interests of caution.
My story is written primarily for the informed general public, to pro-
vide a perspective on Iraq that helps in understanding the country 
better. Both international development practitioners and academic 
experts should find new information and insights from reading it, 
as I did from writing it, comparing my experiences with theirs and 
learning lessons from both. Readers will hopefully include USAID 
and other government staff who have served in Iraq. Military read-
ers will finally find out what some of those civilian types were actu-
ally doing.
I have been extremely careful to get facts right. Because I am not 
from Iraq, there are probably passages that reflect some personal 
misunderstanding or relied on information from some Iraqis that 
might be disputed by others. At times I had to sort out direct con-
tradictions. I can only apologize for any errors. English spelling of 
names and places and of Arabic words in general is often arbitrary 
and unavoidably varies by author. I put most Arabic words in italics.
This book is intended as a politically independent and balanced 
account. Yes, I do mean that. Attacking others is not my purpose. 
Mistakes were made and have been noted, and some were more 
apparent to those of us on the ground. Readers with sharply defined 
ideological perspectives may be disappointed with this approach. 
Those still trying to understand Iraq may appreciate it. Much about 
Iraq is just hard to understand, and it will take years to sort it all out.
Iraq has been a great professional challenge to all of us who have 
gone there to help and also a great learning experience and personal 
adventure. For me being in Iraq was an intensely personal journey. 
I have not tried to hide the emotional highs and lows. Iraq provided 
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some of the happiest moments of my life, thanks to all the shared expe-
riences with expat and Iraqi colleagues, but some of what I observed 
and experienced was truly tragic.
Before going to Iraq, I had virtually no experience in coping with 
tragedies such as losing a friend to assassination or having a friend 
self- imprisoned at home under threat of assassination. As a lifelong 
civilian, I had never experienced the loss of buddies in warfare. I had 
no coping mechanisms for creating professional distance so as not 
to feel overwhelmed. I still don’t, and the tragedies I experienced 
have changed me.
It will be apparent that I care deeply about the Iraqi people and 
came to feel I was a small part of their struggle. Serving in Iraq was 
a highly emotional experience that lives on. This is the world where 
I lived, and some of those who joined the struggle for the future of 
their country worked for me. They are among the people I care about 
most in this world. They are my friends and my heroes, and my spirit 
is with them.
For all of these reasons I came to think of myself as an American 
from Iraq. From that perspective I feel a personal loyalty to the peo-
ple of Iraq in their ongoing struggle for security, stability, democ-
racy, justice, and a better life.
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